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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IDA M. JOHNSON, Administratrix
of the Estate of C. TENNYSON
JOHNSON, deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v.s.-

C.ase No. 8647

ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARDMAN AUTO SALES,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the
record. The parties will he referred to here as they appeared in the trial court) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the second in a series of five cases which
were tried before the District Court of the Third Judicial
District involving a head-on collision which occurred
on December 20, 1954. The defendant Nathan Child
was driving a 1951 International pickup truck east on
highway 40, 10 miles west of Salt Lake City, when it
collided with an .automobile in which the de-ceased, C.
Tennyson Johnson, was a passenger. The liability of
defendant Hardman was based upon the faet that de-
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fendant Child was his agent and servant and was on
a joint venture with him. Verdict and J udgrnent were
rendered in favor of plaintiff again.st both defendants
Hardman and Child in the sum of $43,628.23.
The first case in this group to reach this Court
was Anderson vs. Hardman, No. 8580, the opinion in
which case has been rendered but has not been reported
either in the Pacific Reporter or the Utah Reports.
The facts in the Anderson case and the present ca.se
are the same. It clearly appears that the truck driven
hy Child belonged to Hardman and ·was being driven in
furtherance of Hardman's business as a used car dealer.
Hardman testified that he did not intend to transfer
title until he arrived at Sunset (37, 38) and ~tated that
when they reached there the papers completing the deal,
including a conditional sales contract, would be signed
( +!). He further testified that when they left Tooele
there had been no discussion about "~hether there would
be a provision for attorneys fees, about the form of the
note or contract or about whether title would be retained
hy Hardn1an ( -!6, -tS, 49).
'Ve sub1nit that the opinion in Anderson Ys. Hardman
has rP~oln'd the i ~sues in tl1is case in fayor of respondent and against appellant.
The Staten1ent of Facts contained in the brief of
a pp<>lla.nt liard1nan is inaccurate and does not fairly
set forth the evidence. Howeyer. we do not feel it neces-
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3
sary to make a Statement of Facts because the statement of facts contained in the Anderson opinion accurately sets forth the testimony and a reading of that
opinion will supply the Statement of Facts in the present case.
We will meet e.ach of the points raised by appellant
in the order in which he sets them forth in his brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS THE
AGENT OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR
HI'S JOINT VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS
LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
ON THE LAW OF THE CASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS THE
AGENT OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR
HIS JOINT VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS
LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

We submit that this Court in Anderson vs. Hardman
has ruled as a matter of law that defendant Hardman is
responsible for the negligence of defendant Child and is
liable for any damages proximately caused by such negligence. This Court states :
"The basic question on appeal is whether
or not under the facts the conceded negligence
of defendant Child can be imputed to the defendant Hardman under one of the following theories,
to-wit:
(a) Child was the employee of Hardman.
(b) Child was Hardman's agent.
(c) Child and Hardman were engaged in a
joint enterprise.
There is no substantial conflict in the evidence : and the facts concerning the relation between Hardman and Child are uncontroverted.
The question is what conclusion of law must be
dra\vn fron1 the evidenc.e. ··
This ( 'onrt then went on to hold that the evidenc-e
established that the title to the truck had not passed from
Jfa.rrlman to Child ru1d that Child and Hardman were
acting in furtherance of tl1e business of Hardman in
effecting a sale of the truck to Child. The trip from
Too<'h' to ~nn~Pt was in furtherruwe of Hard.Inan's busilW~s and "·.as for the purpose of cmnpleting the sale.
~ill<'<'

the unenntroverted f'\~idence establishes this
t ht>rP <'an he no qtwstion but that Hardlnan is responsihle as a nw t tt~r of law for the negligence of defendant
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~

Child. We .submit that this determination disposes of
the case and the Judgment should be affirmed.

~I

.t;

POINT II.

~:.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
ON THE LAW OF THE CASE.

The defendant finds fault with the instructions of
the trial court. These questioned instructions relate entirely to the rela:tionship between Hardman and Child.
Inasmuch as that relationship was established by uncontroverted evidence and as a matter of law defendant
Hardman i,s responsible for Child's negligence, the Court
need not consider these instructions.
In order to make a complete answer to appellant's
brief we, nevertheless, will consider the claimed errors.
This Court in the Anderson opinion did not set forth
in detail the clairned errors in instructions. It merely
stated:
"Nor do we find any prejudicial error in
any instruction given by the court or in the n•fusal to give any requested instruction."
A perusal of the bri·efs in that case shows the sarne
type of error was claimed there· as here and this Court
determined the instructions were without prejudicial
error. Hence, we submit that the Anderson case i.s also
authority for the proposition that the instructions in
this case are correct.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10
This instruction attempted to define and set forth
the issues as reflected by the pleadings of the parties.
While there i~ no statement by the trial court expressly
saying that the defendant Hardman denied the agency
relationship between Hardman and Child, it is pointed
out that the defendants in their answers deny they were
negligent. It is to be noted that the defendant Hardman
in his answer (7) did not specifically deny the agency
but 1nerely set forth a general denial.
This instruction did not purport to set forth the
dements that plaintiff would have to prove in order
to recover judgment. This matter was fully covered
by Instructions X o. 12 and 13 and plaintiff was thereby
required to prove agency. Certainly e\eryone connected
"·ith the case knew without any doubt that Hardman
('ontended he was not responsible for the actions of
Child.

'r

e submit that there was no prejudicial error comInit tt>d in giving this instruction and the jury was fully
informed that it would be necessary for then1 to find
h~· a preponderanre of the evidence the essential element~ nece~~ary to 1nake out the relationship between
Hardman and Child whicl1 'vould result in the respon~ihility of Hardman for the negligence of Child.
IX~1,HPCTIOXS

XO. 12 and 13

Tilt>~<' two instruc.tions .are the ones which set forth

the Plements JH'('Pssary for plaintiff to prove in order
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to pennit the jury to return a verdict again.st defendant
Hardman, once the negligence of Child was established.
Instruction No. 12 relates to the question of whether
or not title had passed to the defendant Child. This
instruction is defendant Hardman's Reques.ted Instruction No. 8 with two modifications made by the trial
· court in order that it might correctly reflect the law
and its applica;tion to the case at bar. In it the jury
is told if title had passed then Hardman would not be
liable. This instruction, as well as instruction No. 13,
stated that if the contr.act between the parties had not
been agreed upon in all its terms then title could not pass.
We submit that this is the well recognized rule
in the law of sales.
See Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service Motor Co., 68
Utah 65, 249 P. 133 (1936) wherein the court in holding
that there had been no completed contract and hence
title could not pa.ss st3Jt·ed as follows:
"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds
of Hyrum Jensen and the man.ager of appellant
had fully met respecting all of the essential terms
of the alleged contract for the sale of the Ford
sedan and the purchase of the Star sedan, the
alleged contract failed of consummation, and
hence .appellant cannot recover damages for a
breach thereof, nor can it sustain an action of
trover for the value of the old Ford ,sedan. It
certainly is true that:
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" 'In order that there may be an agreement
the parties must have a distinct intention commo~
to both and without doubt or difference. Until
all understanding alike there can be no assent,
and, therefore, no contract. Both parties must
assent to the same thing in the same sense and
their minds must meet as to all terms.' 13
263,
Sec. 48.

c.i

"Further:
" 'Where the parties have left an essential
part of the agreement for future determination
. .
'
It IS no doubt correct to SR\ that the contract
is not completed.' 6 R. C. L.
643, Sec. 59.

p.

"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply
authority upon a proposition so elementary as
the one here in question, and we shall refrain
from doing so. To the mind of the writer it is
perfectly clear that no binding eontract existed
between Hyrum Jensen and the appellant.

• • • • • • • • •
··For exan1ple, the question of how much of
the purcha~e price of the Star sedan Jensen
should pay in ra:-:h. how 1nuch should be settled
hY the execution of a note. and the length of
ti.me the note slwuld run, were all left for future
rlPtPrmination. ~-\ll of these co11stituted essential
element~. and until fully agreed upon by both
pnrtiP~ either one lwd the right to refuse the
1Prm~ of pa.~'lnent w"11ich nlight be proposed by
the other; henre, tl1e contrart ''as inc01nplete and
nnenfnr<'("\ahle. Nor does the fart that Jensen left
thP old Ford sedan "'ith appellant to be sold
h~· it and tlw proeeeds of the sale aceounted for
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to Jensen alter the legal effect of the transaction.
Nor did it vest the title of the ear in appellant.
Such was no1t the intention of the parties and
such w.as not the legal effect of the tran.saction
as it then stood."
Criticism is levelled at the portion of the instruction
wherein the jury is told that if it found defendant Hardman delivered the truck to Child without any intention
to retain any further interest in said truck, then Hardman was not responsible for its operation. Counsel says
that the jury might have believed that Hardman retained a .seller's lien or " a friendly interest." We submit
that there was no mention of either type of interest in
this ease. No mention or contention was made that a
seller's lien existed. The simple proposition before the
court and jury was whether Hardman intended to turn
over completely and .absolutely his property interest in
the truck. If he did not, then title had not passed.
The next proposition to be decided by the jury
was whether or not defendant Child was driving this
truck for and on behalf of defendant Hardman. If this
second element also existed, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover from Hardman as well .as Child.
Under Instruction No. 13 it was necessary for plaintiff to establish this element in order for the jury to
return a verdict in favor of plaintiff. If the jury found
that Hardman requested Child to drive the pickup truck
to Sunset where the contract would be finally determined,
then Hardman would be responsible. In other words, it
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was necessary for the jury to find that Hardman requested that the truck be driven to the place where the
parties would consummate their contract which would
be in furtherance of the business of defendant Hardman.
From these instructions it becomes evident that defendant's claim that his theory of defense was not presented cannot stand. Plaintiff was required to prove •
both passage of title and agency under the trial court's
instructions. See JIFL' 10.6 and 10.7.
This case has nothing to do with a conditional sales
contract or dealer's "stickers." Xo completed contract
was ever entered into. It may be that when the parties
arrived at Sunset a conditional sales contract would
have been executed (-1-1).
There is no issue in this case about the effect of
the relationship of conditional vendor and vendee on
the qnP~tion of liability. Defendant Hardman did not
place ~tiekers on the car. He placed his own dealer's
platPs thereon. There is certainly a substantial distinction between sti.ekers and dealers· license plates.
\\~e

submit there is no error in any of the instruc-

tion~ gin~n. Plaintiff's t]teory of the ease was full)·
on t I i nPd to the jury m1d it was required to find all of
t ht> p~~l'n t ial elen1ents neeessary to find liability against

dt>fendnnt llardman, ineluding the elenwnts of passage
of tith' nnd Ag'Pll<'y.
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CONCLUSION
The facts in this case concerning the relationship
of defendant Hardman and defendant Child are uncontroverted. There is no dispute in the evidence on this
subject and we believe the determination of the existence
of this relationship is one of law to be determined by
the court. We submit that the relationship of agency
' or master and servant exists in this case as a matter
of law as has already been held by this Court in
Anderson vs. Hardman, supra, and upon this ground
alone the judgment should be affirmed.
Also, there was no prejudicial error in any of the
instructions.
We submit the judgment of the trial court in favor
of plaintiff and against defendant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
by Brigham E. Roberts
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
by Leonard W. Elton
Counsel for Respondent

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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